Pacific Rim markets we study. Baulch (1997) , introducing his parity bounds model (PBM), shows that the use of both price and shipping cost data (level IT analysis), combined with maximum likelihood estimation methods that relax many untenable assumptions about the nature of intermarket price relationships, can eliminate many of the biases of traditional price analysis (level nmethods. But as Barrett (1996) argues, failure to take advantage of the information available in trade flow data still limits the inferential capacity of level IT methods. Li and Barrett (1999) introduce what appears to be the first level III method, one that uses the information in price, trade, and marketing cost data. The Li-Barrett method (LBM) permits distinction between market integration, reflecting the tradability of products between spatially distinct markets -equivalent to contestability between markets -irrespective of the existence or absence of spatial market equilibrium, and competitive market equilibrium, in which extraordinary marginal profits are exhausted by competitive pressures to yield socially efficient allocations, regardless of whether this results in physical trade flows between markets. This paper applies the LBM to a new, rich data set on factor and product markets for the pork industries of several Pacific Rim economies.
Estimating Market Condition Frequencies
The core virtue of the LBM lies in its capacity to use the information from multiple, interrelated data sources to distinguish between interrelated but distinct concepts of market • ... equilibrium and market integration. The two are not synonymous in spite of current praxis. A good definition of market integration is the influence of one market by another through the Walrasian transfer of excess demand. When two markets are integrated, supply and demand in the one market affect the price and/or transactions volume in the other. This definition of integration is closely related to the concepts of tradability or contestability (Baumol 1982) . By this definition, markets can be (imperfectly) integrated even when imperfectly competitive or inefficiently restricted by trade barriers or collusion, whether or not physical flows occur between the markets, and whether or not price in one market responds (especially one-for-one) to shocks in the other.
This more practical and intuitive defintion of market integration-cum-tradability does not equate to competitive equilibrium. Following the familiar logic of spatial equilibrium models, two markets, i and j, are in long-run competitive equilibrium, meaning that marginal profits to intennarket arbitrage equal zero, when Pit ~ 't(P it , Pjt, C ijt ) + Pjt, with Pit the price at location i in time t, and 't the transactions costs of spatial arbitrage, which may be a function of prices (e.g., in the case of ad valorem or variable rate tariffs or insurance) and the exogenous costs of transport between the two locations at time t, C ijt . The equilibrium condition binds with equality when trade occurs. But when trade does not occur, the constraint may be slack so there may be no correlation among market prices in spite of the existence of competitive equilibrium. 2 When two markets are both integrated and in long-run competitive equilibrium, they may be classified as "perfectly integrated," the special case on which the existing market integration literature focuses, as shown by Goldberg and Knetter's (1997) recent review. Tests of the law of one price (LOP), for example, are a test of the perfect integration hypothesis, not a test of (perhaps -... imperfect) integration or of (perhaps segmented) competitive equilibrium.
The LBM builds on switching regimes models, notably Baulch's (1997) parity bounds model (PBM) , that compare observed intermarket price differentials against observed costs of intermarket transport, thereby estimating the probability that markets are in competitive equilibrium (Spiller and Huang 1986 , Sexton, Kling, and Carman 1991 , Baulch 1997 ... is added to (subtracted from) T ji + VI for regimes 3 and 4 (5 and 6). Using the density of the sum of a normal random variable and a truncated normal random variable (Weinstein 1964) , the distribution functions for the observations in each regime are:
(2)
where T, and Y, are intermarket transfer costs and price differentials, respectively, at time t, <I> is the standard normal density function and ~ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The likelihood of observing the sample price, transfer cost, and trade data can therefore be written:
where A is a dummy variable for the occurrence of trade: A=1 if trade is observed and A=O otherwise. The regimes of most concern to economists are typically those reflecting violations of long-run competitive equilibrium. In regime 3, trade occurs and appears to earn positive marginal profits. This implies either (1) insufficient market arbitrage, due either to fonnal or infonnal nontariff trade barriers or to temporary disequilibria (e.g., due to infonnational or contracting lags) that generate rents, or (2) the existence of significant unobservable transactions costs that fill in the gap between the price differential and observable transfer costs. In regime 4, apparent positive profits go wholly unexploited by traders. The plausible explanations for this observation are the same as for regime 3, but the behavioral effect is extremal. Parallel logic holds in regime 5, where transfer costs exceed price differentials yet trade occurs despite negative estimated marginal profits. This is either due to temporary disequilibria (e.g., due to infonnation and contracting lags) or to the existence of significant unobservable transactions benefits (e.g., first mover advantages) accruing to traders.
While price differentials are symmetric (in absolute value) between any two markets, intennarket transfer costs, T" commonly depend on the direction of trade since tariffs vary across countries and backhaul freight rates are sometimes lower than the standard freight rates going the opposite direction. Asymmetric transfer costs implies the need to estimate direction-specific regime probabilities, i.e., one vector A1j related to product moving from market i to market j and a
• second vector, Aji, related to movements in the opposite direction. In general, AIJ_Aji""O, meaning there will not be a unique probability vector describing integration and equilibrium between two distinct markets since direction-specific regime probabilities may differ. This is not a problem for measures of tradability, which is inherently a unidirectional concept. A product is tradable between two markets when it can or does flow from either one to the other. Bidirectional tradability is unnecessary for there to be transmission of Walrasian excess demand between markets. By contrast, equilibrium is an omnidirectional concept, in which the spatial equilibrium conditions should prevail in both directions (e.g., a segmented equilibrium one direction, and perfect integration the other). When only one of the two markets employs nontariff barriers to trade, equilibrium may hold in only one of two directions. By these criteria, we use the maximal direction-specific values of intermarket tradability and perfect integration in describing those market conditions between two (prospective) trading partners. 4 By contrast, we use the bounds created by the two direction-specific results in describing the frequency of spatial market equilibrium. The width of that band is itself suggestive of the underlying efficiency of arbitrage between the markets.
Pacific Rim Pork Industry Factor and Product Markets
We assembled comparable monthly time series data on prices, trade flows, and the costs of intermarket arbitrage over the years 1990-1996 for eight commodities -feedgrains (com and soybean meal), slaughter hogs, chilled carcass and chilled pork cuts (bellies, hams, loins, ribs)5
-from eight countries -Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the United States. 6 We are unaware of any other study that uses either such comprehensive -time series data on the costs of commerce or trade data combined with price and transfer cost data. Data are not available for precisely the same periods across countries or commodities.
Indeed, data are not available on some commodities for some countries. So the number of observations vary across commodity-specific country pairs and the number of country pairs available differ among commodities in the estimation results that follow.
Because we want to account carefully for transfer costs -the observable costs of trading between locations -we have tried to identify precisely the spatial location from which price data are gathered and to include in our transfer cost series those domestic transport costs associated with moving product from interior price reporting locations to or from port, as well as the international c.iJ. and tariff costs associated with moving product from one country's port to another's.7 Data on transfer costs were not publicly available, so we constructed these series, somewhat painstakingly, from U.S. Customs data, national commodity-specific tariff schedules, and domestic transport cost series available from national statistical agencies. As analysts increasingly recognize the importance of incorporating data on transfer costs in market analysis, we hope that government statistical agencies will begin to make series on transfer costs more readily available. At present, the cost of gathering reliable, complete transactions costs time series poses a serious obstacle to using improved, level IT or III markets analysis methods.
The inferential failings of conventional price analysis methods (including correlation coefficients, Granger causality, cointegration testing, error correction mechanisms) arise from characteristics of the underlying (and usually ignored) transfer costs or trade flows (Barrett 1996 , McNew 1996 , Baulch 1997 , McNew and Fackler 1997 . The data show that the factor and product markets of the Pacific Rim pork industries frequently violate assumptions on which existing, linear price analysis techniques depend. For example, trade discontinuity implies a .'
nonlinear or piecewise linear relationship between price series and bidirectional trade implies variation in direction of flow -implying a non-constant sign of t, the transactions cost term in the linear spatial equilibrium model implicitly estimated -product differentiation, or both. Yet continuous, unidirectional trade characterizes less than six percent of the commodity-specific market pairs for which we gathered data; this assumption holds only for trade in primal pork cuts between Japan and Taiwan. And since we could not collect reliable transfer cost series between Japan and Taiwan, not one of the 88 commodity-specific market pairs to which we apply LBM fully satisfies the trade flow and transfer cost assumptions on which conventional methods rest.
Hence the rationale for using LBM to obviate the statistical hazards of traditional price analysis techniques.
Discontinuous trade or trade flow reversals frequently arise due to perturbations in the costs of market arbitrage, including trade policy reforms. Our data show that transfer costs are time-varying and nonadditive, meaning there is some multiplicative component attributable to ad valorem tariffs or graduated insurance or freight schedules. Moreover, they are frequently substantial, nonstationary or both. Figures 1 and 2 present histograms depicting the frequency distribution of mean transfer cost to export country domestic price ratios for direction-and commodity-specific market pairs. These ratios represent the period mean proportional markup necessary to break even on shipments from the exporting country to the importing country.
Transfer costs tend to be greatest as a proportion of price for low value-to-weight commodities (i.e., feedgrains) and for longer distances traveled. Mean transfer costs were only 1.8 percent of export country domestic price for intra-North American trade in chilled pork products, but as segmented equilibrium never occurs with positive and statistically significant probability for either US or Canadian producers of these eight commodities, it occurs for half the primal cuts from Taiwan, two-thirds from Mexico, and all the meat (cuts and carcass) from Japan. In general, the comparative disadvantage of Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines and Taiwan in feed grains, hogs, and pork is apparent from the asymmetric frequency with which those source markets are in segmented equilibrium from the Canadian and United States markets.
Second, segmented disequilibrium 0.'4)' where no trade occurs in spite of the apparent existence of positive profits, likewise appears rarely, only three percent of the time overall, and with five or greater percent frequency in only three cases: bellies and loins from the U.S. into Taiwan, and slaughter hogs from the U.S. into Canada. This likely reflects the fact that trade in higher value-added products and live animals tends to be most subject to nontariff trade barriers, but few such barriers bind completely (Hillman 1991). The observation that unprofitable trade or segmented disequilibrium occurs only five percent of the time is strong empirical confirmation of
• the profit-making behavior of international traders operating in these markets.
Segmented disequilibrium and inefficient integration with positive apparent profits, A 3 , are most likely the consequence of nontariff barriers to trade (e.g., quotas, sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions, and private or public technical barriers) that create positive rents to trade by restricting the free flow of commodities between nations. Such rents exist about 11 percent of the time overall in these markets, but with more than 22 percent frequency in the case of primal cuts (bellies, hams, loins, and spareribs). Part of this is likely attributable to subtle noncomparability of cuts that make intermarket price comparison difficult. But this likely also reflects the relatively greater propensity for nontariff barriers to apply to higher-value-added products, like chilled meats, than to raw commodities, like com, for which 1. 3 +1. 5 occurred with only 1.5 percent frequency.
In several cases the 1. 2 estimates -for the no trade equilibrium within the parity bounds appear rather high. This seems attributable to large standard errors (ou) on those particular estimates, and probably comes at the cost of lower estimates of 1. 6 , the segmented equilibrium.
We therefore suspect the estimates reported here understate the frequency with which Canadian and U.S. producers and processors exhibit comparative advantage over their counterparts in the other six economies and, correspondingly, overstates the frequency with which eastward (i.e., from Asia to North America) intermarket tradability holds.
Tables 3-5 offers summary descriptions of the estimated frequencies of particular market conditions prevailing. The most striking result is that intermarket tradability is effectively ubiquitous, occuring with at least 99 percent frequency in 42/44 commodity-specific market pairs. There is no question that the factor and product markets of Pacific Rim pork industries are
• integrated in the sense of tradability. The LBM estimation results also underscore the distinction between tradability and equilibrium. While equilibrium prevails with at least 96 percent frequency in 43/44 commodity-and-direction-specific market pairs (i.e., the upper bound on market equilibrium is at least 96 percent), many links suffer disequilibrium in one direction. We take this as an indication of nontariff (formal or informal) trade barriers, all of which involve Japan, the United States, or both. Market equilibrium nonetheless prevails at least two-thirds of the time in all products, and effectively continuously in carcass, com, and ham markets. The intersection of tradability and equilibrium, constant perfect market integration (}.'I+A 2 =1) -for which existing methods implicitly test when studying either the absolute or relative versions of the law of one price -holds in only 17/44 market pairs. Hence the need to disentangle market integration-cum-tradability from spatial market equilibrium, as we can using the Li-Barrett method.
The dynamics of intermarket relationships merits some discussion at this point. The LBM, like Baulch's (1997) parity bounds model and other switching regime models (Spiller and Huang 1986, Sexton et al. 1991) , does not estimate the dynamics of price or intermarket relationships, and so is not well suited to answering questions surrounding the speed with which market prices converge on equilibrium. This should serve as a caution against applying LBM to high frequency data. Yet, for moderate-to-Iow frequency data, like the monthly series we use here, this method seems well-suited. For example, it takes just over two weeks, including non transport time, to ship chilled pork cuts from a processing plant in North Carolina by refrigerated truck to Seattle and then by ship to Japan. If prices between the United States and Japan are not in equilibrium on a monthly basis when it takes only a half-month to move product between the -most distant points, that information alone is quite informative.
... The first two columns are the unweighted arithmetic means of the maximal direction-specific estimate from each country pair. The last column is the unweighted arithmetic mean of the direction-specific estimates. 2. Goldberg and Knetter (1997: 1245) , reflecting the bulk of the literature, claim that "[a]ny perfectly competitive market is characterized by the condition that price equals marginal cost. Therefore a perfectly competitive market must be integrated." The claim in the second sentence relies on the assumption of an interior solution, i.e., continuous tradability. When comer solutions occur -as manifest by no trade -segmented equilibria are possible. Since trade can also occur without perfect competition -as in the case of binding quotas -equilibrium is neither necessary nor sufficient for integration, nor vice versa.
3. Baulch's (1997) PBM is a special case of our model that applies when there is no variation in trading status (Le., A=1 all periods or A=O all periods), in which case the only available information comes from price and transfer cost data.
4. Equivalently, the minima are the most appropriate estimates for market segmentation between a pair of markets (A 4 +A 6 ).
5. Since the mid-1980s, chilled meats have overtaken frozen meats in international commerce, apparently because consumers prefer the quality of chilled over frozen meat.
6. Different countries' authorities define and report data on these products slightly differently. Although we have taken pains to ensure reasonable comparability among the series, these are surely not perfectly homogeneous commodities across all the countries. Details on all the data series are available in Barrett et al. (1997) .
7. Note that the cif costs include more than just transport costs. Thus our series tend to be somewhat higher and more comprehensive than the International Wheat Council's freight rate series for heavy grains, which has occasionally been used by researchers, or the Ocean Freight Rate Report series available from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service.
8. During the period 1990-96, Canada imposed no tariffs on imported pork or slaughter hogs. The United States imposed a specific duty of 2.2 cents per kilogram on primal pork cuts, but no duty on carcasses or slaughter hogs. Pork from Canada to the United States became duty free under the North American Free Trade Agreement, which was effective January 1994 by Presidential Proclamation 6641 of December 15,1993. Taiwan imposed a 15% (10%) ad valorem duty on pork and carcasses (on slaughter hogs). Japan employed a more complex ... variable rate schedule under which specific duties apply over some ranges, ad valorem tariffs over others, all tied to variable trigger prices.
9. There is also evidence that macroeconomic shocks may also add to international trade costs through their effects on the incidence of sea piracy, which occurs disproportionately in Asian waters and has risen sharply in the wake of the east Asian crisis (Sullivan and Jordan 1999 
